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The	macro-financial	 situation	of	 the	Spanish	economy	has	 improved	since	
the	 publication	 of	 the	 last	 Financial Stability Report (FSR); however, 
vulnerabilities and risks are still at heightened levels. The progress in the 
vaccination of the population and the effectiveness of the measures implemented 
by the authorities to mitigate the impact of the pandemic have allowed the activity 
to recover progressively, in line with the central scenario of forecasts, although the 
sectors most affected by the health crisis are still clearly below the level of 2019. 
These factors explain why there has been no increase in doubtful loans in the bank 
credit portfolio as a whole, although there are latent impairments whose 
materialization will depend on the evolution of the economy and the pace of 
withdrawal of the measures. In this context, bank profitability has recovered to pre-
pandemic levels, although this was low compared to other sectors and geographies. 
In any case, it is necessary to continue to maintain a close surveillance of the 
financial system, since, as detailed below, vulnerabilities remain high in relation to 
levels prior to the onset of the crisis, and there are risks whose materialization could 
hinder the process of economic and financial normalization (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1
R1. Deterioration of financial conditions and correction of financing asset values 
R2. Downward adjustments or delay to the recovery of economic growth
V1. Financial weakness













SOURCE: Banco de España.
a In this report, vulnerabilities are defined as economic and financial conditions that increase the impact or probability of materialisation of risks to financial 
stability. The latter are in turn identified as adverse changes in economic and financial conditions, with an uncertain probability of occurrence, which 
hamper or impede financial intermediation, with negative consequences for real economic activity.
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The main vulnerabilities1 of the Spanish economy and financial system include:
 — V1.	The	weak	financial	position	of	certain	segments	of	households	
and	firms. By the end of the first half of 2021, most sectors of activity had 
regained their pre-crisis turnover levels (see Chart 1). This has allowed 
profitability to recover, while favourable financing conditions have 
moderated liquidity risks, and average debt and financial burden ratios 
decreased. However, the recovery remains incomplete in the hardest-hit 
sectors (e.g. hospitality, transport and car manufacturing), which have 
recorded the largest increases in bank debt, and also non-performing 
loans (see Chart 2). These sectors also account for the bulk of the latent 
impairment of bank loans. For now, scenarios of significant increases in 
business failures appear to have been avoided, but it should be noted that 
extraordinary measures continue to provide very significant support. In 
the case of households, the overall trends of recovering income and 
employment (which is now close to its pre-crisis levels), and rising saving 
1	 	In	this	report,	vulnerabilities	are	defined	as	economic	and	financial	conditions	that	increase	the	impact	or	probability	
of	materialisation	of	risks	to	financial	stability.
SOURCES: Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria and Banco de España.
a The severely affected sectors are those whose turnover fell by more than 15% in 2020.
b The moderately affected sectors are those whose turnover fell by more than 8%, but less than 15% in 2020.
c The least affected sectors are those whose turnover fell by less than 8% in 2020.
d Credit to sectors affected to a differing degree by the COVID-19 crisis is measured on the assumption that the NACE sectors identified in Chart 1 correspond 
















2  CUMULATIVE CHANGE IN BANK CREDIT TO NON-FINANCIAL














































































































































































































































CHANGE IN ANNUAL TURNOVER: 2019-2020
CHANGE IN SIX-MONTHLY TURNOVER: 2019 H1-2021 H1
%
1  BUSINESS TURNOVER BY SECTOR
Rate of change relative to the same period of 2019
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT. AUTUMN 2021   THE STABILITY OF THE SPANISH FINANCIAL SYSTEM: MAIN VULNERABILITIES AND RISKS
SOURCES: Intervención General de la Administración del Estado (IGAE) and Banco de España.
a The pre-Covid-19 scenario replicates the simulations of public debt over GDP ratio produced with data and projections with the cut-off date December 2019. 
The neutral fiscal policy scenario simulates the projections of debt using the last Banco de España’s forecasts, see Macroeconomic Projections for the Spanish 
Economy (2021-2023), with no additional restrictions on the structural balance variation. The fulfilment of the SGP scenario, assumes a consolidation plan for 
public debt with a reduction in the structural deficit, up to the budged balance, of 0,5 pp of GDP every year. The last scenario adds structural reforms that would 
lead to an increase of potential GDP in 0.6 pp in the long term.
b The red (green) colour of the bars indicates a negative (positive) contribution of the item concerned to the change in consolidated profit for June 2021 with 
respect to June 2020. The black diamonds show ROA excluding extraordinary items. In particular, in June 2020: goodwill adjustments (-€12.2 billion), 
deferred tax asset adjustment (-€2.5 billion) and asset management business sale (€0.3 billion); and in June 2021: extraordinary income as a result of a 
merger (€2.9 billion) in particular, negative goodwill; segregation of an insurer (€0.9 billion) and extraordinary restructuring costs (-€1.2 billion).
































4  A BREAKDOWN OF THE CHANGE IN PROFIT OF THE BANKING SECTOR
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3  SIMULATED PATHS OF PUBLIC DEBT (a) 
are firming. However, households with close links to employment in the 
sectors hardest hit by the health crisis and those with low incomes have 
benefited less from the recovery and are especially vulnerable. Moreover, 
their borrowing behaviour differs from that of other households. A slower 
than expected recovery in activity or an increase in financing costs may 
lead to significant increases in non-performing loans in these more 
vulnerable segments of households and firms.
 — V2. The increase in government debt. As noted in the FSRs published 
since spring 2020, a corollary of the necessary and decisive economic 
policy response has been an increase in public debt. In Spain, the 
expected reduction in the budget deficit in the coming years is notable, 
as a result of the improvement in the cyclical situation. However, a 
significant reduction in of public debt in the medium term will require the 
elimination of the structural component budget deficit, in line with 
European regulations  and, in the absence of an adequate fiscal 
consolidation plan, the level of debt may remain high for an extended 
period (see Chart 3). During this process, the high level of public debt 
makes the Spanish economy vulnerable to any deterioration in financing 
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conditions and reduces its capacity to respond to a potential risks that 
materialise. The cost of the increase in public debt has, so far, been 
limited by the expansionary monetary policy and this effect will last 
some time longer, given that the debt that is currently maturing was 
issued at higher interest rates. In this context, the recent increase in 
inflation stems from temporary factors, so that the monetary policy 
stance can be expected to remain accommodative; indeed, if monetary 
policy is normalised more rapidly than expected, the potential impact of 
this vulnerability will increase. The yield on long-term sovereign debt 
would probably be that most affected by the uncertainty that could arise 
in the financial markets in the event of a premature withdrawal of the 
central bank purchase programmes launched to mitigate the impact of 
the pandemic. In Spain, the relatively long sovereign debt maturities 
would reduce the immediate impact of these shocks to the interest 
burden.
 — V3.	The	weak	profitability	of	financial	intermediaries. The revival of 
the economy and the improved outlook have led to a reduction in the 
expected losses anticipated by the banking sector and, consequently, in 
the provisions for financial impairments. This, along with the absence of 
the extraordinary charges recorded in 2020, explains the rise in bank 
profitability in the first half of 2021, to its pre-crisis levels, even when the 
extraordinary income for this half is excluded (see Chart 4). The 
contribution of international business to Spanish banks’ performance 
has also returned to normal in the first half of 2021, reflecting how, in 
contrast to initial expectations, geographical diversification is allowing 
to cushion the impact of this global crisis the impact of the crisis on the 
profitability of the banking sector, up to mid-2021, can be considered 
contained. This highlights the effectiveness of economic policy measures 
in mitigating the impact of the crisis, as reflected in the results of the 
stress tests for this year (see Chart 5), which show more contained 
capital charges under the adverse scenario than last year, although a 
certain degree of heterogeneity is observed across banks. In any event, 
the distribution across banks of the CET1 ratio under this scenario would 
not suggest the need for extensive supervisory intervention. However, 
this does not mean that there may not be latent impairment in credit 
portfolios that may materialise in the coming quarters and reduce the 
profits generated by the sector, which would further weaken the 
intermediation capacity of those banks with a lower level of solvency. 
Also, the structural challenges for the generation of profit by the banking 
sector and other financial intermediaries, which the health crisis has 
made no less pressing, continue to exist. These include, in particular, 
the generation of profitable business volume in a low interest rate 
environment, growing competition from technology firms, the increase 
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in cyber risks and the potentially negative effects associated with climate 
risks.
There follows a discussion of the main risks2 to the stability of the Spanish financial 
system:
 — R1.	Possible	deterioration	of	financing	conditions	and	the	correction	
of	financial	asset	values. Despite some temporary correction episodes 
in the first half of the year, the prices of risk-bearing assets on international 
financial markets remain high (see Chart 6). The low equilibrium level of 
long-term real interest rates, as a result of structural factors, such as 
demographic and productivity trends in developed countries and the 
demand for safe assets, which monetary policy attempts to accommodate 
through significant central bank bond purchase programmes, is an 
important factor supporting these valuations (see Chart 7). In this respect, 
2	 In	 this	 report,	 risks	are	 identified	as	adverse	changes	 in	economic	and	 financial	 conditions,	with	an	uncertain	
probability	of	occurrence,	which	hamper	or	impede	financial	intermediation,	with	negative	consequences	for	real	
economic activity.
SOURCES: Refinitiv Datastream and Banco de España.
a The net effect of positive (negative) flows is indicated by the figure above (below) the bar in question. The initial and final CET1 ratios are presented as 
"fully-loaded". Other impacts include, the change in RWAs between 2020 and 2023 and the effect of ICO guarantees. Aggregate results, including both 
institutions directly supervised by the SSM and the Banco de España.
b This variable includes net operating income in Spain and net income attributable to business abroad. Thus, the possible funds generated by the banking 
group as a whole are compared with the impairment losses in Spain (the focus of these tests).
c This variable shows the projection over the three years of the exercise of gross losses due to credit portfolio impairment for exposures in Spain and other 
types of losses (associated with the fixed-income portfolio, the management of foreclosures and the sovereign portfolio).
d The cyclically adjusted PER is calculated as the ratio between the price of the shares and the 10-year moving average of profits. The historical averages are 
calculated for the period 1997-2021.
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IMPAIRMENTS IN SPAIN (c) OTHER IMPACTS
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a fall in asset prices and a tightening of financial conditions (with an 
increase in the currently very low maturity premia, in particular) may be 
triggered if monetary stimulus is withdrawn at a faster rate than the financial 
markets expect. These adverse developments could also occur if investors’ 
expectations of future economic developments or the solvency of certain 
segments of the corporate sector deteriorate. This process may spread to 
other assets and geographical areas given the close interconnections 
between markets and financial intermediaries.
 — R2. Downside risks to economic growth continue to be present, 
although	the	baseline	scenario	 is	more	favourable	than	 in	previous	
quarters. The progress made with vaccination programmes in 2021 has 
strengthened the confidence of economic agents. At the same time, 
economic policy measures have continued to prove their effectiveness in 
averting the less favourable growth scenarios that the pandemic could 
have given rise to. That said, downside risks - albeit more contained - 
remain. These are linked to adverse developments in the health situation, 
which might require the introduction of restrictions on certain activities. 
Also, the risks to activity are now skewed downwards as a result of the 
SOURCES: IHS Markit, Refinitiv Datastream and Banco de España.
a Risk premia are obtained from a decomposition of 10-year interest rates into term risk premia and expectations about short-term interest rates. Expectations 
are obtained by predicting the instantaneous short-term interest rates using an ARFIMA model on each of the components of the yield curve (long-term level, 
slope and curvature) estimated daily. Once the short-term rate expectations are obtained, the premia can be had taking the difference between 10-year rates 
and short rate expectations. The historical averages of the term premia are calculated for the period 2003-2021.
b The historical average real 10-year interest rate in the euro area and the United States is calculated for the period 2004-2021. Until July 2008 in the euro 
area and June 2007 in the United States data are used for indexed bonds in France and the United States. After those dates, the real interest rates are 
calculated in the euro area as the difference between the 10-year overnight indexed swap rate and the compensation for inflation with the same term and 
in the Uinited States as the difference between the 10-year government bond and the compensation for inflation with the same term.
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sharp increase in the price of energy and the emergence of global 
production chain bottlenecks (see Chart 8). This is leading to increases in 
inflation that erode agents’ purchasing power and, consequently, the 
incipient reactivation of activity. In addition, if these factors that temporarily 
raise inflation were to be prolonged over time, they could end up raising 
the medium-term inflation expectations of the agents, and they may 
contribute to a tightening of financing conditions in the short term, and 
dampen further the potential for economic recovery (see Chart 9). A slowing 
of the recovery would have a negative effect on the quality of credit to 
households and firms, especially in the most vulnerable sectors. These 
may see an increase in non-performing loans even amid a general recovery, 
if this is asymmetric and fails to reach the hardest-hit sectors. Economic 
activity faces greater risks in the emerging economies; the ability of 
economic policy to react to shocks to activity is limited by the stronger 
inflationary pressures in these economies and they are exposed to a 
tightening of financing conditions as a result of the normalisation of 
monetary policy in the advanced economies.
SOURCES: Instituto Nacional de Estadístico and Banco de España.
a The shaded areas show two periods of financial crisis identified in Spain since 2009. These correspond to a period of systemic banking crisis (the last crisis: 
2009 Q1-2013 Q4) and the crisis caused by COVID-19 (2020 Q1-2021 Q2).
b The output gap is the percentage difference between actual GDP and its potential value. Values calculated at constant 2010 prices. See Cuadrado, P. and 
Moral-Benito, E. (2016), Potential growth of the Spanish economy, Occasional Paper No 1603, Banco de España. The credit-to-GDP gap is calculated as the 
difference in percentage points between the actual ratio and its long-term trend, calculated by applying a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing 
parameter equal to 25,000. This parameter is calibrated to fit the financial cycles observed in the past in Spain (see Galán, J.E. (2019), Measuring credit-to- 
GDP gaps. The Hodrick-Prescott filter revisited, Occasional Paper No 1906, Banco de España). Data available to June 2021. The broken red horizontal line 
represents the reference CCyB activation threshold of 2 pp for the credit-to-GDP gap. 
c Each point in the chart coresponds to a sector of business activity in accordance with the NACE Rev.2 classification and represents the difference of the 
average PD (weighted by the number of borrowers) for this sector over a three-year horizon between a baseline trend scenario without the application of 
measures and adverse scenarios resulting from different extensions of the CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme. See Box 3.1 for further details. 
d This adverse scenario considers an increase in the price of CO2 emission allowances from €25 to €100.
e This adverse scenario considers the combination of the scenario described in (d) with an extension of the requirement for allowances to more productive 
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Precisely	 tuned	monetary	 and	 fiscal	 policies	 continue	 to	 be	 essential	 for	 the	
recovery	in	economic	growth	to	firm. The expansionary stance of these policies still 
needs to be maintained in the short term since, although financial stability risks and 
vulnerabilities stemming from the pandemic have moderated in recent months, they 
continue to be high. A flexible approach adapted to changes in the economic situation 
and risk profile also needs to be maintained, avoiding a premature withdrawal of the 
stimulus before the recovery firms. 
Developments	in	inflation	expectations	and	the	rate	of	recovery	of	activity	will	
be	decisive	in	the	positioning	of	monetary	policy. Monetary policy is expected to 
be less accommodative in the coming months, in particular as a result of the winding 
down of asset purchase programmes in Europe and the United States. However, the 
baseline scenario continues to assume that the increase in inflation will be temporary, 
so that the rate of policy tightening is not expected to accelerate.
Fiscal	policy	must	remain	expansionary	in	the	short-term,	but	a	medium-term	
fiscal	 consolidation	 programme	 to	 contain	 and	 reduce	 the	 vulnerabilities	
associated with high public debt needs to be drawn up. The fiscal policy 
measures deployed during the crisis need to be increasingly selective and focused 
on the economic sectors and population segments for which the recovery is proving 
to be slowest. In addition, an ambitious structural reform programme to boost the 
potential growth of the Spanish economy would also contribute to this objective and 
mitigate the other risks considered. Effective application of the Next Generation EU 
(NGEU) funds would help to reconcile these two aims.
In	the	absence	of	signs	of	systemic	financial	imbalances	building	up	in	Spain,	
a	loose	prudential	policy,	without	the	activation	of	macroprudential	tools,	 is	
also advisable. It should be noted that, in spite of the support measures adopted, 
the pre-pandemic levels of activity have still not been recovered. Key indicators of 
financial imbalances, such as the credit-to-GDP gap, are still dominated by the 
sudden fall in output in Spain in 2020 and their high level should not be interpreted 
as signalling a build-up of risk (see Chart 9). The negative output gap has begun to 
close and, in line with the expectations for recovery, a significant reduction is 
expected by the end of next year. In any event, the reduction of output and credit 
gaps is subject to downside activity risks and also to the vulnerability of certain 
segments of households and firms, so that continuous monitoring is needed for 
early detection of signs of risk. 
In	 some	European	 countries	macroprudential	 policy	 tightening	 has	 already	
begun,	mainly	as	a	result	of	warning	signals	in	their	property	markets. In Spain, 
the real estate cycle does not appear to be as advanced. At aggregate level, housing 
is not showing signs of overvaluation; new mortgage credit is growing strongly in 
2021, but from very low levels, without a significant increase in the stock or any 
loosening of credit standards. However, if the expansionary trend in real estate 
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intensifies, this risk diagnosis will need to be reassessed. In this respect, the reform 
of Circular 2/2016 will provide new macroprudential tools to address with a more 
effective and focused approach the potential build-up of risks in the future.
Other more long-term risks must also continue to be taken into account, 
including	those	of	financial	digitalisation	and	climate	change. Digitalisation is 
not only generating new financial products and changing the way in which the 
markets that trade them are organised, but also making the financial system more 
vulnerable to cybernetic risks. Climate change may also have important financial 
stability effects, through the materialisation of both physical and transition risks. In 
the case of the latter, the estimated impact on bank solvency is still moderate, but 
adds to the pressure of the low bank profitability. At the same time, the materialisation 
of physical risks would potentially have a very significant long-term economic impact, 
which would exceed the impact of the transition costs. Thus, according to this 
analysis, the action required to achieve an environmentally sustainable productive 
model that does not contribute to the materialisation of climate change should be 
taken without delay.
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